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TAMING THE FCPA OVERREACH THROUGH AN
ADEQUATE PROCEDURES DEFENSE
DIETER JUEDES*
ABSTRACT
Currently many American corporations must pursue and develop
international business relationships. For these American firms, the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is the most important U.S. law
governing international commerce. The FCPA prohibits firms from bribing foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business in a
foreign country. Despite its infrequent use during the last quarter of the
twentieth century, Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) enforcement actions under the statute have exploded in
the last few years. Due to this increase in enforcement and the difficulties
in complying with the FCPA, the anti-bribery statute has caused American
firms to avoid foreign markets and prospective growth areas, creating a
competitive imbalance for U.S. companies.
This Article proposes an adequate procedures defense as the best way
to fix this imbalance and allow American corporations to operate efficiently
overseas without the cloud of FCPA liability hanging over them. The defense would allow American firms to escape FCPA liability upon showing
that they had adequate procedures in place designed to detect and prevent
international bribery. To be sure, Congress has recently considered amending
the FCPA to add a similar defense, and others have suggested that Congress
take such action. However, this piece goes further in so much as it proposes
specific statutory language that Congress could use in adopting such a
defense and it establishes precise factors to be promulgated by the DOJ
and SEC for determining whether a firm’s procedure would be deemed
“adequate.” Lastly, the Article details projected outcomes associated with
American firms being able to use the adequate procedures defense.
*
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INTRODUCTION
To survive in today’s complex commercial world, many American
corporations must develop international business relationships and pursue
transactional opportunities abroad.1 For these American firms, the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)2 is the most important United States (U.S.)
law governing international commerce.3 Passed in 1977, the FCPA prohibits American corporations (both public and private)4 from paying bribes to
foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business in a foreign country.5 To promote the anti-bribery ban further, the FCPA also requires that corporations with securities listed in the U.S. keep financial
books and records that accurately reflect payment to foreign officials and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls.6 The books and records
provision works in tandem with the bribery provision, as one (the bribery

1

Indeed, American firms are looking outside the United States in part because of the
“increase in globalization and the saturation of domestic markets.” Mike Koehler, The
Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 997 (2010) [hereinafter Koehler,
Façade]; see also Ashby Jones, Legal Maze’s Murkiest Corners, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24,
2012, at B1, B5 (explaining that American “companies are rely[ing] on markets outside
the U.S. for an increasing percentage of revenue”).
2
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2006).
3
See Koehler, Façade, supra note 1, at 997.
4
The FCPA’s bribery prohibition is also applicable against U.S. citizens, foreign
companies listed on a U.S. stock exchange, or any person who, while physically present
in the U.S. pays, offers to pay, or promises to pay a foreign official anything of value to
obtain or retain business. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), 78dd-2(a)(1), 78dd-3(a)(1)
(2006). However, this paper only focuses on the impact of the FCPA on American corporations and their subsidiaries. Notably, the Act is applicable to U.S. parent corporations
for the actions of their foreign subsidiaries. See The Lay Person’s Guide to the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, at 3, available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf [hereinafter DOJ,
Lay Person’s Guide]. FCPA enforcement actions have predominantly targeted American
firms. See Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, SHEARMAN & STERLING
LLP, Feb. 13, 2008, at 2–4, available at http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA
_Trends.pdf.
5
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006). It is notable that with respect to U.S. companies, the
FCPA has extraterritorial application—a violation can occur even if the prohibited
conduct takes place entirely outside the U.S. Id. Congress passed the Act in 1977, in the
wake of Watergate investigations, which revealed corporate bribery practices. STUART H.
DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS
1 (2005). According to the Department of Justice, “Congress enacted the FCPA to bring a
halt to the bribery of foreign officials and to restore public confidence in the integrity of
the American business system.” DOJ, Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 4.
6
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2006).
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provision) punishes an occurrence of bribery, while the other (the books
and records provision) helps detect bribery.7
Generally, the Department of Justice (DOJ) enforces the criminal antibribery provision and willful violations of the books and records provision,8
while the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforces the civil
anti-bribery provision with respect to issuers.9 The DOJ and SEC seek (and
often times garner) monetary penalties or settlements for violations of the
FCPA.10 When sanctioning firms, as opposed to individuals, organizations
charged with criminal violations of the anti-bribery provisions may face
fines of up to $2 million per violation.11
Despite the statute’s infrequent use in its first twenty-five years,12 the
number of FCPA enforcement actions has greatly increased in the past six
years.13 The DOJ recently said that enforcing the FCPA is now one of its
7

See ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 2 (2010) [hereinafter WEISSMANN & SMITH], http://www.instituteforlegal
reform.com/sites/default/files/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf.
8
DOJ, Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 4, at 2 (“The Department of Justice is responsible for all criminal enforcement.”).
9
See id. Because all criminal violations of the Act are conducted by the DOJ, the SEC
may send a case to the DOJ for criminal prosecution. See Amy Deen Westbrook,
Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 495 n.14 (2011).
10
See Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to
Debar?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 793–94 (2011). Besides monetary fines, another potent sanction remains available to the DOJ for violations of the FCPA—debarment of the
firm from future contracts with the U.S. government. This sanction is available under the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). See FAR 9.406-5 (2010).
11
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), 78dd-3(e)(1)(A), 78ff(c)(1)(A)–(2)(A) (2006).
The SEC has a wide amount of discretion in determining the nature of its civil enforcement actions; the agency can seek fines, injunctions, or both of these remedies. See David
C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits, and
the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and
Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 478 (2009).
12
See Daniel Chow, China Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2012 WIS. L. REV.
573, 574 n.2 (noting that in 2003 the U.S. government initiated nine FCPA investigations).
13
See, e.g., Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 389 (2010) [hereinafter Koehler, Resurgence]
(“[D]uring the past decade, enforcement agencies resurrected the FCPA from near legal
extinction.”); Westbrook, supra note 9, at 494 (noting the “recent radicalization” of the
FCPA’s enforcement); see also Joseph Palazzolo, U.S. Probes Motorola Solutions, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 27, 2011, at B8 (“In recent years, the SEC and Justice Department have
enforced the FCPA aggressively and have added staff in their anti-bribery units.”). In
November 2010, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer stated that “FCPA enforcement is stronger than it’s ever been—and getting stronger.” See Lanny Breuer, Assistant
Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Address at the 24th National Conference on the Foreign
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top priorities—second only to fighting terrorism.14 Indeed, in 2010, seventyfour enforcement actions were brought by the DOJ and SEC, and eight of
the ten costliest FCPA-related settlements were reached.15 There are a multitude of reasons for the increase in enforcement actions, including the increase in global business transactions,16 the recent global financial crisis17 and
related U.S. corporate scandals,18 and aggressive prosecution and regulation.19
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov
/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html).
14
See Laurence A. Urgenson et al., New Bumps and Tolls Along the Road to FCPA
Settlements, BUS. CRIMES BULLETIN, Nov. 1, 2009, at 1.
15
2010 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 3, 2011),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf. In
2011, the DOJ initiated twenty-three enforcement actions and the SEC initiated twentyfive, for a total of forty-eight. United States: 2011 FCPA Enforcement Actions Reach
Second-Highest Level, DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www
.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/162240/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/2011+FCPA+Enforcement
+Actions+Reach+SecondHighest+Level. In 2012, the DOJ initiated eleven enforcement actions and the SEC initiated twelve enforcement actions, for a total of twenty-three. 2012
Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 2, 2013), http://
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2012YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf. Despite
enforcement actions decreasing in two consecutive years, all indications are that FCPA
enforcement will continue to be robust. Id. (quoting Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney
General for the DOJ’s Criminal Division, as stating that “there is no turning back” from
the “robust FCPA enforcement” of previous years.). Indeed, a recent survey completed
by the Wall Street Journal reflected that the FCPA remains one of the top concerns for
companies and their in-house legal counsel. Jones, supra note 1, at B1.
16
See MARTIN T. BIEGELMAN & DANIEL R. BIEGELMAN, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT COMPLIANCE GUIDEBOOK: PROTECTING YOUR ORGANIZATION FROM BRIBERY AND
CORRUPTION xxi (2010) (noting the current importance of the FCPA due to the globalization of business); Westbrook, supra note 9, at 518 (explaining the “growth in global
business opportunities during the economic boom of the mid-2000s”); see also Lawrence
J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Minefield
for Directors, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 145, 146 (2011) (noting the “[i]ncreased international commerce between the United States and faster growing economies such as the
People’s Republic of China”).
17
See Catherine Rampell, Lax Oversight Caused Crisis, Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 2010, at A1.
18
See Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 781, 794 (2011) [hereinafter Yockey, Solicitation].
19
See id. at 793 (noting that prosecutors may be “turning up the heat” so that they can
transition to lucrative private sector employment where they then represent companies
facing FCPA scrutiny); see also Nathan Vardi, How Federal Crackdown on Bribery
Hurts Business and Enriches Insiders, FORBES (May 24, 2010), http://www.forbes.com
/forbes/2010/0524/business-weatherford-kbr-corruption-bribery-racket.html. As an example, Vardi notes William Jacobson, who transitioned from a justice official to partner
at a large law firm and eventually general counsel at a corporation that previously had
bribery problems. Id.
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Because of the increase in FCPA enforcement20 and the strong remedial powers available to the DOJ and SEC,21 the FCPA is currently one of
the most feared statutes for American firms operating overseas.22 This fear
stems from the fact that perfect compliance with the FCPA is oftentimes
extremely difficult due to the statute’s expansive language, its lack of affirmative defenses, the absence of judicial and administrative guidance,
and the practical realities involved in generating international business.23
With the increased enforcement of the FCPA and the difficulties in
complying with the statute, American firms are at a disadvantage when it
comes to competing internationally.24 Indeed, both large and small firms
have spent millions of dollars on FCPA compliance, have poured money
and energy into internal investigations aimed at determining whether a
FCPA violation occurred, and have, in certain instances, avoided foreign
markets altogether because of the FCPA.25 These implications reveal just
how helpless American firms are against the FCPA. American firms need
some type of tool that will incentivize compliance with the Act and curtail
liability when the DOJ or SEC brings an action, and this tool is an “adequate procedures” defense. This defense will allow any American firm
charged with violating the FCPA to show that it had adequate procedures
in place to prevent a violation, and if the procedures are deemed sufficient,
the firm avoids liability.26
20

See Koehler, Resurgence, supra note 13, at 389; see also Mike Koehler, Revisiting
a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 657
(2012) [hereinafter Koehler, Revisiting] (noting that approximately eighty companies are
currently under investigation for FCPA violations).
21
2008 and 2009 saw record-setting settlements—for example, Siemens AG ($800
million) and Halliburton ($579 million). This trend continued in 2010: Technip ($338
million) and Snamprogetti/ENI ($365 million). Westbrook, supra note 9, at 492–93.
22
See Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 781.
23
See infra Part I.
24
See infra Part II.
25
See infra Part II.
26
See infra Part III for a detailed discussion, including the predicted outcomes, of the
adequate procedures defense. Additionally, it should be noted that similar proposed defenses have been dubbed the FCPA “due diligence defense” and the compliance defense.
See Koehler, Revisiting, supra note 20, at 609, 618; James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA:
A Modest Proposal for Change in Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62
BUS. LAW. 1233, 1234 (2007). This Article uses the phrase “adequate procedures defense”
because it best embodies the fact that (1) procedures must be in place designed to prevent
bribery and (2) those procedures have to be “adequate.” This proposal differs from the
others insomuch as it (1) establishes specific factors to be promulgated by the DOJ and
SEC for determining whether or not a procedure will be “adequate,” and (2) details specific projected outcomes associated with American firms being able to use the defense.
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To be sure, this Article does not posit that the FCPA should be outlawed or that foreign bribery is appropriate.27 Bribery impacts the allocation
of scarce public resources,28 distorts markets, and reduces investment.29
This Article argues that to strike the proper balance between the necessity
to prevent bribery and allow American corporations to operate efficiently
overseas without the threat of FCPA liability, Congress should amend the
FCPA to add an affirmative adequate procedures defense. Further, the DOJ
and SEC should promulgate a rule detailing factors that will be reviewed
in determining whether a corporation had adequate procedures in place. In
leading up to these proposals, Part I of this Article details the current difficulties American firms face in complying with the FCPA and avoiding
liability exposure. Part II then analyzes the implications arising out of the
difficulties in compliance. Part III details and projects the outcomes of the
adequate procedures defense. The Conclusion offers a brief summation.
I. COMPLIANCE DIFFICULTIES
Complying with the FCPA and limiting exposure to DOJ or SEC enforcement actions is a difficult, if not overwhelming, task for many American
corporations.30 These difficulties stem from numerous considerations including expansive FCPA statutory language and interpretation, a lack of
(and narrowly interpreted) affirmative defenses to liability, missing judicial or administrative clarification, and the practical realities associated
with pursuing international business transactions. Each consideration receives explanation below, in turn.
A. Expansive Statutory Language and Interpretation
The FCPA’s bribery provision generally prohibits American companies (or their agents) from corruptly paying or offering to pay money or
27

Cf. Doty, supra note 26, at 1239 (explaining that U.S. companies have no desire to
compete on the basis of bribery).
28
See Mark B. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
15 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 627, 627 (1983).
29
Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid
Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 441 (2010) (“Bribery
inhibits economic growth by two primary mechanisms: economic inefficiency and
reduced investment.”).
30
See Editorial, Justice’s Bribery Racket, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2012, at A12 (“Over
the last five years, however, Justice has begun to stretch the law into a far more blunt
instrument. Instead of going after clear violations, the vague statute has become a tool to
prosecute or threaten legions of companies.”).
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anything of value to a foreign official to obtain or retain business.31 Both
the DOJ and SEC have taken an expansive interpretation of the statute,
specifically with respect to what constitutes a foreign official.32 The statute
defines “foreign official” in part as “any officer or employee of a foreign
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof ....”33
The most confusing part of this definition is the term “instrumentality,”
which itself is not defined in the statute.34 The DOJ and SEC have not
clarified or established a list of factors for determining whether someone
is an instrumentality of a foreign government.35 In direct contrast, the DOJ
has admitted that “it is entirely possible, under certain circumstances and
in certain countries, that nearly every aspect of the approval, manufacture,
import, export, pricing, sale and marketing of a drug product in a foreign
country will involve a ‘foreign official’ within the meaning of the FCPA.”36
As evidenced by the DOJ’s statement above, in many instances the
term “instrumentality” “sweeps in payments to companies that are stateowned or state-controlled.”37 Once that company is “defined as an instrumentality” under the FCPA, all employees or agents of the company “are
considered ‘foreign officials.’”38 The courts have not tested this expansive
definition of foreign official,39 and recently members of Congress have
encouraged the DOJ to clarify “under what circumstances an employee of
an instrumentality who is not exercising the sovereign authority of the
state may be considered a ‘foreign official.’”40
31

See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006).
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 27
(2011) [hereinafter FCPA Hearing] (statement of the Hon. Michael B. Mukasey, Partner,
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) (“The DOJ’s and SEC’s enforcement ... make clear that they
interpret the terms ‘foreign official’ and ‘instrumentality’ extremely broadly.”); Westbrook,
supra note 9, at 531 (noting that the “most contentious point of [the] FCPA interpretation” is what constitutes a “foreign official”).
33
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A) (2006).
34
Stacy Williams, Grey Areas of FCPA Compliance, CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J.
Winter 2008 at 14, 16 (“The meaning of the term ‘instrumentality’ is one of the most
challenging aspects of FCPA compliance.”).
35
See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 532.
36
DOJ’s FCPA Team Pressing Forward With Pharma Probes, MCGUIRE WOODS LLP
(July 20, 2010), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/item.asp?item=4976.
37
WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 25.
38
Id.
39
See id.
40
Letter from Amy Klobuchar, U.S. Senator (Democrat, Minnesota), & Chris Coons,
U.S. Senator (Democrat, Delaware), to Eric Holder, Attorney General (Feb. 15, 2012),
available at http://www.mainjustice.com/justanticorruption/wp-admin/documents-databases
/265-2-judiciary_FCPA_02_16_12[1].pdf. This letter demonstrates that the current overreach
32
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A few examples demonstrate just how expansively the DOJ and SEC
interpret the term “instrumentality” within the definition of “foreign official.”
In an action against American construction company KBR, the DOJ and SEC
alleged that KBR made improper payments to employees of Nigeria LNG
Limited (LNG Limited).41 The government claimed that these employees
were foreign officials under the FCPA despite the fact that the Nigerian
government had a minority ownership stake in LNG Limited.42 LNG Limited settled with the government, and thus, the government never clarified
its interpretation of “foreign official.”43 Additionally, in 2007, the DOJ and
SEC brought FCPA “actions against Baker Hughes and its subsidiaries for ...
payments made to a company called Kazakhoil.”44 The agencies claimed
that these payments violated the FCPA because Kazakhoil was “controlled
by officials of the Government of Kazakhstan.”45 Baker Hughes settled
with the agencies for $44.1 million.46
The difficultly with the loose interpretations of instrumentality is that
the FCPA now applies to payments made to “non-core” individuals who
are employed by state-owned entities, including a minority ownership interest by the state (e.g., KBR case), or state-controlled (e.g., Baker Hughes
case) entities.47 Thus, it is difficult for firms and their agents “to determine
ex ante what companies are sufficiently state-owned or state-controlled to
qualify as an instrumentality of a foreign official,” that is, whether the
FCPA applies to a particular foreign transaction or business relationship.48
This difficulty is especially prevalent in countries like China, where state
ownership of companies is particularly high.49
of the FCPA is an issue for both Democratic and Republican legislators, and presumably
amending the FCPA would be favored by members from both political parties. See
Justice’s Bribery Racket, supra note 30 (noting the concern in Congress amongst liberals
and conservatives).
41
WEISMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 26.
42
Id. Indeed, in that case, 51 percent of Nigeria LNG Limited was “owned by a consortium of private multinational oil companies.” Id.
43
See SEC Charges KBR, Inc. with Foreign Bribery, Litigation Release No. 20897A, 95
SEC Docket 570 (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20897a.htm.
44
WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 25.
45
Id.
46
See SEC Charges Baker Hughes With Foreign Bribery and With Violating 2001
Commission Cease-and-Desist Order, Litigation Release No. 20094, 90 SEC Docket 1369
(Apr. 26, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/litigation /litreleases/2007/lr20094.htm.
47
See Koehler, Façade, supra note 1, at 965.
48
Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 821.
49
WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that “in countries where many
companies are state-owned,” like China, it is not “immediately apparent whether an individual” would be a foreign official under the FCPA). In a related vein, pharmaceutical
companies operating internationally are particularly exposed to the FCPA because “the
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B. Narrow Exceptions and Affirmative Defenses
Although the FCPA bribery liability provision has received broad interpretation, the exceptions and defenses to liability are narrow.50 The FCPA
contains one exception and two affirmative defenses, all three of which
provide limited safe harbors for firms looking to avoid FCPA scrutiny.51
1. The Facilitation Payment Exception
The statute provides an exception for payments made to secure “routine
governmental action[s].”52 The phrase is defined in the statute as “an action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official,”53
and it includes several examples, such as payments made in connection
with granting permits, scheduling inspections, and providing police protection.54 However, any decision by a foreign official to award new or
continued business does not fall within the exception.55 Accordingly, the
payments that cause a foreign official to act with little or no discretion fall
in the exception and payments that motivate a foreign official to use his or
her discretion in awarding business do not.56 As Professor Joseph Yockey
notes, however, the distinction between non-discretionary acts and discretionary acts “is easily stated, but applying it in practice can be difficult.”57
This real world difficulty in applying the exception makes it almost
impossible to rely upon.58 For example, in 2008, the DOJ and SEC charged
Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation with FCPA violations
doctors and hospitals they do business with are government employees in many countries.”
Johnathan D. Rockoff & Christopher M. Matthews, Pfizer Settles Federal Bribery Investigation,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2012, at B7. At least eight drug makers have acknowledged FCPA investigations in recent SEC filings. Id. Also, “[t]he [SEC] has written to several Hollywood
studios” regarding “their dealings with ... officials in China.” John Jannarone & Michelle
Kung, SEC Probes U.S. Studios on China, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2012, at B2. The inquiries are believed to be related to the FCPA, and in the coming months more details
will surely emerge. See id. For background regarding the FCPA’s application in China,
see generally Chow, supra note 12.
50
Westbrook, supra note 9, at 541.
51
Id. at 505–07.
52
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (2006).
53
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A) (2006).
54
Id.
55
Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 818.
56
See id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 819 (noting that in many circumstances, the exception can “rarely be relied
upon”); Westbrook, supra note 9, at 542 (“[T]he ambiguity surrounding this exception
combined with its increased enforcement makes compliance difficult.”).
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when its India subsidiary made payments to officials employed by the Indian
Railway Board.59 Some payments were made for “scheduling pre-shipping
produce inspections and having certificates of product delivery issued.”60
“Because the matter ultimately settled through a non-prosecution agreement,”
it remains unclear why these “payments did not fall within the facilitation
payment exception.”61 Nevertheless, this example shows the difficulties
many firms face in determining whether payments made to officials fall
outside of the exception.62
2. Affirmative Defenses: Rarely Applicable, Rarely Used
The first defense applies if the payment, offer, or promise to pay anything of value to a foreign official is “lawful under the written laws and
regulations” of the foreign country.63 To comply with this defense, the law
“‘must be affirmatively stated and written; neither negative implication,
custom, nor tacit approval’” is sufficient.64 Simply put, because no country
has written laws that expressly permit bribery, this defense is an illusory
safe harbor.65
The second defense applies if the payment, offer, or promise to pay anything of value is a “reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and
lodging expenses... directly related to—(A) the promotion, demonstration,
or explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution or performance
59

See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 542; Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 818.
Westbrook, supra note 9, at 542.
61
Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 819.
62
Id.
63
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1) (2006). For background and
a thorough analysis of the FCPA defenses, see generally Kyle P. Sheahen, Note, I’m Not
Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative Defenses Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 464 (2010).
64
Westbrook, supra note 9, at 506 (quoting David Krakoff et al., FCPA: Handling
Increased Global Anti-Corruption Enforcement, IN FOCUS: CORPORATE LITIGATION WHITE
PAPER (Mayer Brown), Feb. 25, 2008, at 3, http://www.mayerbrown.com/Publications/article
.asp?id=6386).
65
ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK 16 (2010);
see also Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 16, at 157 (explaining that experts
have never found a law that expressly permits bribery). Although the focus of this Article
is on FCPA firm liability and not individual liability, it bears noting that the FCPA “local
law defense” was recently invoked by Frederic Bourke. See United States v. Kozeny, 582
F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Bourke argued that the payments were legal under
the laws of Azerbaijan because he self-reported the payments, and thus, under Azeri law,
no prosecution would occur in that county. Id. The U.S. court rejected this argument,
stating that just because prosecution would not occur in Azerbaijan, it does not necessarily mean that the bribes were legal under that country’s law. Id. at 540.
60
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of a contract with a foreign government or agency thereof.”66 In essence,
this defense allows American firms to offer “small gifts as tokens of goodwill or to show hospitality to foreign officials.”67 This defense has been
deemed “amorphous” because the courts and the DOJ have offered little
guidance as to when the expenditure is related to goodwill or hospitality,
or when the expenditure rises to the level of a bribe.68 To date, no court
has analyzed this defense.69
C. Lack of Judicial and Administrative Guidance
When faced with DOJ or SEC FCPA enforcement proceedings, American firms understand “[t]he potential monetary and reputational consequences that would follow from an ... indictment or guilty verdict.”70 Because
of these consequences, the only realistic option available to businesses is
to settle their lawsuits.71 In fact, only one business entity has challenged a
DOJ and SEC enforcement case through trial in the last twenty years.72
Instead, corporations often enter into settlements in the form of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) or Non-Prosecution Agreements
(NPAs).73 Under DPAs, the DOJ formally charges the corporation, but the
agency defers actual prosecution so long as certain governance changes
66

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2) (2006).
Westbrook, supra note 9, at 542.
68
Cf. id.
69
Id.
70
Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 825; see also Justice’s Bribery Racket,
supra note 30, at A12 (noting the “reputational risk of an indictment”).
71
Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 825 (noting that “firms feel they must accept”
settlements); see Joan McPhee, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Ray of Hope or Guilty
Plea by Another Name?, INSIDE LITIG., Winter 2006, at 4, available at http://www.ropesgray
.com/files/Publication/a6d348fd-f6fd-4f4a-b38b-bd6de98836b7/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/4d1fdc14-3bcf-463a-b2b0-76204fc7f316/Article_Winter_2006_Deferred
_Prosecution_Agreements_McPhee.pdf (“Given the breadth of the corporate criminal
liability doctrine and the potentially devastating consequences of a criminal conviction or
even indictment, it is the rare corporation today that has a meaningful right to a jury trial
in the resolution of its corporate criminal disputes with the government.”); see also Doty,
supra note 26, at 1236 n.9 (explaining that the government uses the “threat of indictment”
to force firms to settle and not litigate). Doty also notes the “associated practice” of
requiring firms to waive the attorney-client privilege. Id.
72
Koehler, Revisiting, supra note 20, at 627 n.73 (noting that the only time a corporate FCPA charge was presented to a jury was in the 2011 Lindsey Manufacturing case);
see also Koehler, Resurgence, supra note 13, at 406.
73
Koehler, Façade, supra note 1, at 933 (“The DOJ’s use of NPAs and DPAs has exploded in recent years.”).
67

2013]

TAMING THE FCPA

49

are implemented and a fine is paid.74 Under NPAs, no formal charges are
filed, but similar terms and fines are accepted.75 “Because an NPA is not
filed with a court, there is absolutely no judicial scrutiny” of the facts and
legal conclusions leading to the settlement.76 Additionally, although a DPA
is filed with a court and could be subject to judicial scrutiny, the agreements are regularly “rubber-stamped” by judges without modification.77
This lack of judicial oversight78 yields two important, related outcomes.
First, the DOJ and SEC’s vast interpretative policies are never limited
through the judicial process.79 This means that the DOJ and SEC’s interpretations control.80 Second, no precedent is set, and thus, firms have no baseline
measure for determining which actions are clearly legal under the statute.81
Instead, firms have little guidance on how to comply with the FCPA.82
This lack of guidance makes it difficult for American firms to enter emerging foreign markets and partake in aggressive business transactions without knowing affirmatively whether their actions violate the FCPA.83
74

Doty, supra note 26, at 1236 n.9 (noting that DPAs “have become virtually commonplace” in FCPA actions).
75
Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 825.
76
Koehler, Façade, supra note 1, at 935.
77
Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 893 (2007).
Several commentators and practitioners who have experience with DPAs and NPAs agree
that the forms of settlements never face judicial scrutiny. See Candace Zierdt & Ellen S.
Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract
Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1, 14 (2007) (“Deferred and non-prosecution agreements often
occur without judicial oversight or participation .... Even in the rare case that has court
participation, it is usually a mere formality of the document being filed in the court.”).
78
James C. Morgan, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Recent Justice Department
Guidance, Manufactures Alliance/MAPI e-Alert E-466 (Apr. 2, 2008), available at
http://www.mapi.net/Issues%20in%20Brief/e-Alert466.pdf.
79
FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 2 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner, Member,
House Comm. on the Judiciary).
80
Id. (noting “the absence of case law interpreting the breadth and scope of the FCPA,”
which consequently “inflates ... prosecutorial discretion”); see also Mike Koehler, Big,
Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L.
REV. 99, 131–32 (2011) [hereinafter Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre] (explaining that
lack of “appropriate checks and balances or judicial scrutiny” with respect to FCPA
enforcement leads to inconsistencies).
81
FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 2 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (explaining
that industries do not know how to conform to the law); Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre,
supra note 80, at 131–32 (noting the “lack of consistency and transparency” associated
with FCPA compliance).
82
FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 2 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (noting that
“companies lack guidance”).
83
See id.
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Not only does the FCPA suffer from a lack of judicial oversight, but
also the DOJ and SEC have not sufficiently filled this void through administrative guidance.84 To be sure, “[p]rocedures [do] exist through which the
DOJ and SEC can provide ... FCPA interpretation.”85 The SEC procedure—
an Opinion Release—is largely unused, as the last time the SEC used this vehicle to clarify the FCPA was 1981, when it explained that action would not
be taken for minor or unintentional errors in books and recordkeeping.86
The DOJ vehicle—a DOJ FCPA Opinion Release Procedure—which
is required by the FCPA statute,87 allows an issuer to “obtain an opinion
of the Attorney General as to whether certain specified, prospective—not
hypothetical—conduct conforms with the [agency’s] present enforcement
policy regarding the antibribery provisions” of the Act.88 To obtain an opinion, a company must make a formal inquiry describing the proposed conduct.89
Within thirty days, the DOJ must respond and state whether it would take
action on the proposed conduct.90 If the DOJ signs off on the proposed conduct and the firm does not deviate from the action that was approved, then
any DOJ legal proceeding arising out of the approved conduct is subject to
a rebuttable presumption that the conduct complies with the FCPA.91
Although on paper the DOJ opinion process appears to be a viable option for a firm contemplating business in a foreign country, the process has

84

Westbrook, supra note 9, at 496–97. Recently, in November 2012, the DOJ and
SEC published a guide to help corporations better understand which practices might
violate the FCPA. A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 14, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. FCPA practitioners and scholars
criticized the guide as doing “little to fill in the gray areas” and being “more of a scrapbook of past DOJ and SEC successes than a guide book for companies who care about
playing with the rules.” Joe Palazzolo & Christopher Matthews, Bribery Law Dos and
Don’ts, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 15, 2012, at B1, B2 (quoting Steven Tyrell, partner at Weil,
Gotshal & Manges LLP and former chief of the DOJ’s criminal-fraud section); see also
Mike Koehler, Grading the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance, White Collar
Crime Rep. (BNA) 1, 7 (Dec. 14, 2012) (stating that even after the resource guide, “much
about FCPA enforcement remains opaque”); Jones, supra note 1, at B5 (explaining that
the guidance “wasn’t as specific as many companies had hoped”).
85
Westbrook, supra note 9, at 563.
86
Statement of Policy, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Exchange Act Release
No. 17,500, 21 SEC Docket 1466, 1469 (Jan. 29, 1981).
87
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e), 78dd-2(f) (2006).
88
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, 28 C.F.R. §§ 80.1 (2009).
89
28 C.F.R. §§ 80.2, 80.6, 80.7.
90
28 C.F.R. § 80.8.
91
See 28 C.F.R. § 80.10.
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been disused.92 A number of reasons have been suggested for the underutilization of this process. First, the process may be seen as mere “window
dressing” by firms and actually alert law enforcement to potential illegal
bribery.93 Additionally, the DOJ may be projecting its own discomfort
with the concept of advising on potentially criminal behavior—a concept
unique to the FCPA.94
It should also be noted that the opinion notices are limited to the specific facts presented and not legally binding on any other company (even if
the other company’s conduct was directly analogous to conduct opined
upon in a prior release).95 This consideration, in conjunction with the DOJ
opinion procedure’s underutilization, illustrates that firms cannot depend
on the Department for guidance in determining what conduct leads to
FCPA exposure.
To recap, the lack of judicial and administrative guidance on the FCPA
in combination with agencies interpreting the statute broadly while interpreting the defenses narrowly creates an environment where businesses
struggle to comply with the Act. These struggles are only exacerbated by
the practical realities associated with pursuing foreign business—an area
detailed next.
D. Practical Realities in Generating Foreign Business
As explained in the introduction of this Article, to survive in today’s corporate world, American corporations (both big and small) must search for and
develop business connections and operations outside of the U.S.96 Foreign
markets provide access to resources that are not available domestically.97
In order to facilitate foreign business, many firms have no choice but to use
agents.98 Additionally many firms must deal with hostile environments in
92

See Opinion Procedure Releases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov
/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (documenting two releases in
2012, one in 2011, three in 2010, and one in 2009); see also Doty, supra note 26, at 1238.
93
Doty, supra note 26, at 1238 (“[W]hile heightened awareness has led to procedural
due diligence by U.S. businesses abroad, too often that diligence is dismissed by law
enforcement as pretense, mere ‘window dressing’ to conceal ‘behind the scenes’ circumvention of the law that businesses and host governments alike are deemed to understand and countenance.”).
94
Doty, supra note 26, at 1238 & n.17.
95
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, 28 C.F.R. §§ 80.11, 80.13
(2012) (narrowing the scope and limiting the effect of an opinion release).
96
Doty, supra note 26, at 1252.
97
See supra note 1.
98
See Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 784.
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which bribery is not suggested by the firm’s agent, but instead is demanded
by the foreign official.99
1. Necessity to Use Agents
In foreign markets, “business traditions and customs are far different
[from] those in the United States.”100 These differences cause transnational
firms to use “specialized local agents and intermediaries.”101 Using agents
also allows firms to enter new markets without having to set up an actual
office or subsidiary in that foreign state.102 However, as detailed further in
Subsection II below, employees or agents in these countries are often subject
to widespread corruption and they often discover that bribery is necessary
to gain access into a market and to continue business in that market.103
Under the FCPA, bribery committed by an agent or employee is particularly significant because it can lead to a firm being held liable under
principles of vicarious liability.104 This common law doctrine allows a corporation to be held liable for the acts of its employees where the act was
within the scope of employment and benefited, at least partially, the organization.105 Almost all FCPA corporate enforcement actions are based on
principles of vicarious liability because firms can only act through their
agents or employees.106
Corporations can implement strategies to deter agent bribery and thus
reduce exposure under vicarious liability.107 The strategies may include
offering monetary incentives to the agent to deter bribery, having policies
and procedures in place to prevent and detect bribery, and conducting due
diligence before deciding to place an agent in a certain country.108 However,
99

Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the “Culture of Compliance,”
2012 WIS. L. REV. 689, 710 [hereinafter Yockey, FCPA Settlement] (noting that many
foreign markets are rife with corruption).
100
Westbrook, supra note 9, at 518 (quoting Phyllis Diamond, Attorney Sees More
Individuals Named in Ramped Up FCPA Enforcement Effort, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA),
no. 32, 2009 at 1495).
101
Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 808.
102
ALEXANDRA ADDISON WRAGE, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION 12 13 (2007).
103
Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 810.
104
Id. at 809; Frank C. Razzano & Travis P. Nelson, The Expanding Criminalization
of Transnational Bribery: Global Prosecution Necessitates Global Compliance, 42 INT’L
LAW. 1259, 1275–76 (2008).
105
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, 9-28.800 (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.800
(elaborating the principals of federal prosecution of business organizations).
106
Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 810.
107
Id. at 811.
108
Id.
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there is currently no statutory-based acknowledgement (i.e., statutorybased defense) for having adequate procedures in place designed to prevent bribery.109 Consequentially, as Professor Yockey explains, “firms have
been prosecuted where the employees responsible for the alleged violations acted contrary to well-documented FCPA compliance policies.”110
2. Bribe Demands
When tapping into foreign resources and entering foreign markets,
“American businesses ... operate in some of the most corrupt and ‘failed’
states on the globe.”111 As a result, these businesses receive demands for
bribes quite frequently.112 These demands can take a variety of forms, including being asked to sponsor activities in exchange for a government
contract and paying various fees for routine government-related transactions.113 Additionally, outright extortion of American companies operating
overseas is not uncommon.114 Extortion takes the form of requests for
payment (or goods) under a threat to terminate the corporation’s current
investment.115
Although it is often difficult to track the amount of demand-side bribery and extortion, a recent survey of more than 2,700 business executives
in twenty-six countries found that about 40 percent of respondents had
109

Doty, supra note 26, at 1235–36 (explaining that “the current law enforcement
regime ... impute[s] vicarious liability to the corporate enterprise without regard” to the
firm’s “codes of conduct [that] prohibit FCPA violations”).
110
Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 811.
111
Doty notes that the reason companies operate in these areas is perhaps best
captured by Willie Sutton’s statement that “he robbed banks ‘because that’s where the
money is.’” Doty, supra note 26, at 1252 (citing Famous Cases & Criminals: Willie
Sutton, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/willie-sutton (last visited
Feb. 2, 2013)).
112
INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET AL., RESIST: RESISTING EXTORTION AND
SOLICITATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 6 (2011), available at http://www.iccw
bo.org/Data/Documents/Corporate-Responsibility-and-Anti-corruption/RESIST-English/;
Former DOJ FCPA Chief Supports FCPA Compliance Defense, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 4,
2011) (quoting Joseph Covington, former DOJ FCPA Unit Chief), http://www.fcpaprofessor
.com/former-doj-fcpa-chief-supports-fcpa-compliance-defense (“[i]n my almost 40 years of
experience, I have rarely seen American companies affirmatively offering bribes in the first
instance; rather they are typically reacting to a world not of their making.”); see also Koehler,
Revisiting, supra note 20, at 620 (explaining that American firms operating in foreign
countries “are often funneled into an arbitrary world of low-paying civil servants who frequently supplement their meager salaries through payments condoned in the host country”).
113
Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 795.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 795–96.
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been sought out to pay a bribe.116 In certain countries, including Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Pakistan, this number rose to almost 60 percent.117 To be sure, this survey only reflects one side of the
story. Often times it is hard to determine whether a foreign official first
demanded bribery or whether the foreign official’s demand followed previous bribery suggestions or actual bribery on the part of the firm.118 Nevertheless, regardless of what came first, a bribe demand or a bribe solicitation, bribery in some way, shape, or form is seen as a normal course of
business in order to transact internationally.119
To be clear, the prevalence of demand-side bribery noted in this section is not meant to suggest that bribery should be tolerated or that the
FCPA should not apply in foreign countries.120 It is noted to show that in
some countries the prevalence and frequency of bribery may cause a rogue
employee or agent to go against a firm’s anti-bribery policy and bribe a
foreign official.121 These firms are then subjected to potential liability despite their good-faith efforts to curtail bribery.122 Of course, these firms
could have simply opted not to transact in a specific country, especially
when aware that their agents may subject them to FCPA liability.123 However, given the vast resources available in foreign markets and the necessity to tap into these resources,124 it is unrealistic and imprudent to force
116

TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009 4 (2009), available at
http://archive.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2009/2009_09_23
_gcr_2009.
117
Id. at 4.
118
See Yockey, FCPA Settlement, supra note 99, at 711 (noting there are “situations
where the lines between bribery and extortion are blurry”); see also James Lindgren, The
Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695,
1695–98 (1993) (explaining that it is difficult to distinguish bribery from extortion).
119
Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 795 (“[F]irms doing business abroad
continue to report receiving demands for bribes—including some demands that rise to the
level of extortion—on a daily basis.”).
120
See Doty, supra note 26, at 1239 (“U.S. businessmen want the statutory policies of
the FCPA to prevail. Repeal of the statute would enable states tolerant of corrupt behavior by their national industries to up the ante without restraint.”). But see Gideon
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Bribes vs. Bombs: A Study in Coasean Warfare, 29
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 179, 179–81 (2009) (noting that bribery may help resolve
disputes); Donald Bates, Payola’s Payoff: Legalize Bribery? Yes, It’s a Fact of Life,
HOUS. CHRON. Jan. 15, 2006, http://www.chron.com/default/article/Legalize-bribery-Yes
-it-s-a-fact-of-life-1476410.php.
121
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
122
See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
123
Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 809–10.
124
Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 16, at 147 (explaining that “[f]oreign
operations constitute a major source of revenues and earnings” for American companies).
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American firms to choose between either staying out of these markets or
being subjected to FCPA scrutiny. As former SEC General Counsel James
Doty notes, “[t]o serve the national interest, American businesses must
operate” internationally.125 Because American firms must operate internationally, their only choice then is to face the current overreach of the FCPA.
Part I of this Article documented the current difficulties American
firms have in complying with the FCPA. These difficulties stem from a
number of interrelated considerations. The DOJ and SEC interpret the
statutory text to cover a wide variety of circumstances that subject firms to
liability in which they have limited legitimate defenses.126 More specifically, the realities of operating internationally are not considered in establishing liability or as an affirmative defense.127 Because firms know that
FCPA liability is easily established, they are unwilling to try FCPA enforcement actions. Thus, no limiting principles are established through the
judiciary, and this is compounded by the unwillingness of the DOJ and
SEC to limit their interpretations or provide meaningful guidance.128
There are numerous implications that result from the difficulties
American firms have in complying with the FCPA, an area detailed next.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FCPA IN LIGHT OF THE
DIFFICULTY WITH COMPLIANCE
The recent enforcement expansion of the FCPA and the difficulties
firms have in complying with the Act yield two principal outcomes. First,
firms must deal with the monetary and reputational consequences of facing DOJ and SEC FCPA actions.129 Second, these monetary and reputational considerations influence future foreign business decisions, causing
American firms to be overly risk adverse.130
A. Monetary and Reputational Consequences
Firms immersed in full-blown FCPA investigations spend enormous
sums on legal fees, forensic accounting fees, and other investigative
125

Doty, supra note 26, at 1252 (emphasis added); see also Trautman & AlternbaumerPrice, supra note 16, at 148 (noting the inevitable “co-dependence” between the United
States and Chinese economies). Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price also explain that even
if an American firm is not currently doing business overseas, “the overwhelming odds are
that it will in the future.” Id. at 149.
126
See supra Part I.A–B.
127
See supra Part I.D.
128
See supra Part I.C.
129
See infra Part II.A.
130
See infra Part II.B.
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costs.131 For example, Baker Hughes conducted an internal investigation
that cost $50 million, in addition to paying $44 million in penalties.132
Avon Products reported in its February 2011 quarterly SEC filing that it
spent $59 million more in 2010 than 2009 on “professional and related
fees associated with [its] FCPA investigation and compliance reviews.”133
Not only do firms spend a tremendous amount of money on legal and
investigative costs, but settlements also are burdensome. Indeed, in recent
years, the monetary amount of FCPA settlements has increased dramatically.134 Examples include the high-profile settlements involving U.S. companies such as Halliburton Co. and Johnson & Johnson.135 In 2010, eight
of the top ten FCPA settlements were reached,136 and in the past five years,
corporations’ penalties under the FCPA have amounted to $4 billion.137
Firms facing FCPA scrutiny also have to deal with the reputational
consequences that come along with such scrutiny, something former SEC
131

Klobuchar and Coons Letter, supra note 40 (“[I]t has become apparent that too
many companies are devoting a disproportionate amount of resources to FCPA compliance and internal investigations.”); WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 5 (“Businesses
enmeshed in a full-blown FCPA investigation conducted by the U.S. government ... will
continue to spend enormous sums on legal fees, forensic accounting, and other investigative costs before they are even confronted with a fine or penalty, which ... can range
into the tens or hundreds of millions.”); see also Yockey, FCPA Settlement, supra note 99,
at 702 (“Litigating an FCPA case is not cheap.”). Yockey notes the “unique complexities
involved in FCPA cases” such as “obtaining evidence from foreign countries,” communicating with foreigners, and making travel arrangements. Id. To this end, recently, law firms
have increased hiring in temporary attorneys who have foreign-language skills in part to
help review documents associated with FCPA investigations. See Jennifer Smith, Wanted:
Temp Attorneys with Foreign-Language Skills, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2012, at B1, B5.
132
Peter Jeydel, Note, Yoking the Bull: How to Make the FCPA Work for U.S. Business,
43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 523, 527 n.21 (2012).
133
Avon Products, Annual Report (Form 10-k) (Feb. 24, 2011) at 29, available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/8868/000119312511044531/d10k.htm. Since 2009,
Avon’s cumulative legal costs due to FCPA investigations total $248 million. Joe
Palazzolo, et al., Prosecutors Ask to Meet Jung in Avon Bribe Probe, WALL ST. J., July
30, 2012, at B1, B2.
134
WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 2; see also Christopher Matthews and Joe
Palazzolo, Pfizer Near Settlement on Bribery, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2011, at B1–B2, avail
able at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203710704577050303870770014
.html (noting that Pfizer Inc. will pay more than $60 million and Johnson and Johnson
$70 million to resolve U.S. government anti-bribery probes).
135
Joe Palazzolo, Business Slams Bribery Act—Lobby Urges Curbs in Wake of $4
Billion in Corruption Fines, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2011, at B1; see Corporate Watch, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 17, 2012, at B6 (reporting that Halliburton paid $579 million to resolve violations).
136
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
137
Palazzolo, supra note 135, at B1.
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General Counsel James Doty deems “wear[ing] the scarlet letter” of FCPA
actions.138 These consequences include exclusion from future transactions
and government contracts,139 in addition to future difficulties securing financing from lending institutions.140
B. Disincentives to Partake in International Business Transactions
Because of the monetary and reputational consequences that stem from
FCPA scrutiny, American businesses have become more adverse to undertaking business transactions abroad.141 This adverseness also stems from
the lack of predictability regarding whether a particular firm’s conduct is
within the bounds of the FCPA.142 Firms depend on a certain amount of
litigation predictability so that they can take chances in untapped markets,
develop complicit transactional plans, and inform employees on how to
comply with these plans.143 When the FCPA threatens predictability,
138

Doty, supra note 26, at 1253.
Morgan, supra note 78, at 3 (noting that accepting a DPA may be identical to an
indictment for a company seeking future government contracts).
140
FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 40 (statement of George J. Terwilliger, III,
Partner, White & Case, LLP) (explaining the “risk to reputation that can arise” from
FCPA scrutiny); Doty, supra note 26, at 1253.
141
FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 40 (statement of George J. Terwilliger, III)
(“When faced with [FCPA] uncertainty, companies sometimes forgo deals they could
otherwise do, take a pass on contemplated projects or withdraw from ongoing projects or
ventures.”); Palazzolo, supra note 135, at B8 (noting evidence suggesting that U.S.
“companies shun [oversea] deals for fear of triggering FCPA probes”); see also Nicholas
M. McLean, Note, Cross-National Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, 121 YALE L.J. 1970,
1980 (2012) (explaining that the possibility of an FCPA enforcement action “may
dissuade U.S. firms from investing in [certain] countries”). Other scholars, however, have
expressed doubt that the FCPA stifles foreign investment. See Macleans A. Geo-JaJa &
Garth L. Mangum, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s Consequences for U.S. Trade:
The Nigerian Example, 24 J. BUS. ETHICS 245, 251–52 (2000) (concluding that the FCPA
has not disadvantaged American firms).
142
See Doty, supra note 26, at 1234 (“Criminal and civil prosecution, which presently
constitute the principal source of guidance on an important sector of economic activity,
should recede as the basis on which registrants plan their transactions.”); id. at 1239
(noting the lack of predictability associated with the Act); see also Weiss, supra note 11,
at 505 (“Regulatory uncertainty has been quantitatively shown to be particularly harmful
to investment in other contexts—for example, antitrust—and, while no quantitative study
is available for foreign bribery, the likely result is similarly undesirable.”).
143
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING
WORLD 4 (1997), (“[P]redictability of ... rules and policies and the consistency with
which they are applied ... can be as important for attracting private investment as the
content of those rules and policies.”).
139
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American firms—both large and small144—become risk adverse and stop
investing in certain oversea markets.145
A recent Dow Jones risk and compliance survey demonstrated the
chilling effect that the FCPA has on American firm investment overseas.
The survey found that fifty-one percent of companies had delayed a business
initiative and fourteen percent had abandoned an initiative altogether because of unpredictable anti-corruption laws.146 As an example of a company
abandoning an initiative, in 2009, oil services firm Ensco International
elected to abandon its Nigerian operations directly because of its concerns
regarding FCPA scrutiny with regard to payments made to officials for permission to import oil-drilling rigs.147 Additionally, oil firms that previously
had operations in Kazakhstan have withdrawn because of the fear of FCPA
exposure.148 More recently, there is a fear that makers of medical devices
will begin scaling back operations in countries that provide state-owned
health care, including Argentina, Brazil, and China.149 The FCPA is implicated in these circumstances because of the expansive view that healthcare
professionals are foreign officials in these countries.150
The problems with risk aversion are that American firms are not maximizing their capital and are at a competitive disadvantage in comparison
144

Jeydel, supra note 132, at 531 (noting the small businesses are “often paralyzed by
the FCPA”).
145
Klobuchar & Coons Letter, supra note 40 (explaining that “[o]ver-compliance ...
can have a negative effect on product development, export promotion, and workforce
expansion”); Doty, supra note 26, at 1239 (explaining that the FCPA threatens “U.S.
foreign competitiveness with a growing risk of exclusion of U.S. companies from foreign
markets”); Andrew Brady Spalding, Four Uncharted Corners of Anti-Corruption Law: In
Search of Remedies to the Sanctioning Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 661, 662 (“[N]umerous
data sources today confirm that FCPA enforcement leads to a reduction in investment by
US companies ... in countries perceived to be relatively corrupt.”); Vardi, supra note 19
(“FCPA enforcement will cause U.S. companies to reduce investments in places where
corruption is common or make them uncompetitive there.”).
146
Dow Jones Survey: Confusion About Anti-Corruption Laws Leads Companies to
Abandon Expansion Initiatives, DOW JONES (Dec. 9, 2009), http://fis.dowjones.com/risk
/09survey.html. Professor Spalding notes that these statistics make sense because “if we
increase the costs of conducting business in specific ways, we will of course tend to do
less of that business.” Spalding, supra note 145, at 665.
147
Vardi, supra note 19.
148
Id.
149
See Christopher M. Matthews, Corporate News: Biomet Settles Bribery Charge,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2012, at B3.
150
See id.; see also Justice’s Bribery Racket, supra note 30 (quoting Senator
Klobuchar as stating “in today’s China, a nurse could be construed as a foreign official
because they work for the state”).
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to “their foreign counterparts who do not have significant FCPA exposure.”151 In a 1999 report to Congress, the Congressional Research Service,
a nonpartisan group that provides analysis on legislative issues, estimated
that the FCPA’s anti-bribery “provisions have cost up to [$1 trillion] annually in lost [U.S.] export trade.”152 In this vein, it may be useful to consider that the majority of countries with anti-bribery laws provide for an
adequate procedures defense to liability.153 Corporations in those countries
are able to defend against anti-bribery enforcement actions by showing
that they had procedures and policies guarding against bribery in place.154
In the U.S., such a defense is not available,155 and thus, a certain amount
of incongruity exists between America’s approach to worldwide bribery
and other countries’ approaches.156
American firms are in need of a tool that will put them on an even
playing field with their foreign counterparts.157 This tool will also strike the
proper balance between incentivizing foreign investment while at the same
time incentivizing compliance with the Act and not condoning bribery.158
This tool is an adequate procedures defense, a proposal detailed next.
III. ADEQUATE PROCEDURES DEFENSE: DETAILS AND
PROJECTED OUTCOMES
The best solution for altering the current overreach of the FCPA is for
Congress to amend the FCPA to add an adequate procedures defense.159
151

WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 6 (explaining that the FCPA has made
American firms less competitive in foreign markets); Vardi, supra note 19 (noting that
U.S. companies are disadvantaged in the worldwide bribery landscape).
152
MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30079, FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 2 (1999).
153
Koehler, Revisiting, supra note 20, at 635–36.
154
Id. at 635–44 (documenting a defense similar to an adequate procedures defense as
part of anti-bribery statutes in the U.K., Australia, Chile, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland).
155
Id. at 627 (noting that currently a “company’s pre-existing compliance policies and
procedures are not relevant as a matter of law to the organization’s criminal liability”).
156
Bribery Abroad: A Tale of Two Laws, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2011), http://www
.economist.com/node/21529103 (noting the difference between the FCPA and U.K.’s
analog insomuch as the U.K. anti-bribery regime contains a compliance defense). For the
text of the U.K.’s compliance defense, see Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7(2) (U.K.).
157
Cf. Doty, supra note 26, at 1252 (explaining that enforcement of the FCPA does
not have to come at the expense of competiveness of U.S. firms).
158
See WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 7 (arguing for improvements to the
FCPA, “aimed at providing more certainty to the business community,” while keeping
intact the “integrity of the free market system”).
159
Id. (arguing that improvements to the FCPA “are best suited for Congressional
action”); see also Justice’s Bribery Racket, supra note 30 (arguing for Congressional action
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The SEC and DOJ should then promulgate a rule detailing the factors that
will be considered in determining what constitutes an adequate procedure.
This defense will increase compliance with the Act while allowing American
corporations to invest aggressively in international operations.
A. Legislative Amendment Followed by Administrative Guidance
This section suggests specific statutory language that could be adopted
by Congress to provide for an adequate procedures defense. It further suggests specific factors that could be promulgated by the DOJ and SEC for
determining whether a corporation’s procedures were adequate.
1. Congressional Action
Recently, Congress has scrutinized the FCPA in committee hearings.160
Although no official amendments have been proposed, one idea under discussion is an adequate procedures defense.161 The time has now come for
Congress to pass this defense and give American firms a tool against the
overreach of the FCPA.
In turning to the specific statutory language, this Article suggests the
following:
Any corporation subject to the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA that
has established and implemented “adequate procedures” designed to

with respect to the FCPA). But see Richard L. Cassin, Jacobson to DOJ: Fix FCPA
Enforcement Policy, THE FCPA BLOG (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog
/2012/4/16/jacobson-to-doj-fix-fcpa-enforcement-policy.html (noting that former DOJ
FCPA prosecutor William Jacobson stated that Congressional action and FCPA amendments were unnecessary).
160
See generally FCPA Hearing, supra note 32; Examining Enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drug of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Examining Enforcement Hearing],
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg66921/pdf/CHRG-111shrg66921
.pdf. Indeed, this defense is not a novel idea: in 1986, Representative Howard L. Berman
proposed a “due diligence” affirmative defense. Trade and International Economic Policy
Reform Act of 1986, H.R. 4800, 99th Cong. (1986). The House adopted the defense, but it
was ultimately not included in the legislation signed into law. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-576
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547.
161
FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 4–5 (statement of Rep. Conyers, Member, House
Comm. on the Judiciary) (“I want to tell you a suggested amendment that I can support,
and that is the addition of a compliance defense which would permit companies to fight
the imposition of criminal liability for these FCPA violations if individual employees or
agents had circumvented compliance measures that were otherwise reasonable in identifying such violations.”).
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detect and prevent bribery in foreign countries shall not be liable for the
vicarious actions of its employees in DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement
proceedings. The DOJ and SEC are to promulgate a list of factors to be
considered in determining whether a procedure constitutes an “adequate procedure.”

A number of considerations about this statutory language are significant. First, the statute makes clear that the defense will only apply to corporations (not individuals) subject to the anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA. Second, it establishes the defense when a corporation has both established and implemented adequate procedures, meaning that the corporation must show more than the mere establishment of procedures through
“paper-based” polices; it must show that these policies were implemented.
Third, the language incorporates both a detection component and prevention component to combat bribery,162 meaning that corporations should
show that they actively analyzed areas of potential weakness where bribery might occur (detection) and systems were implemented to deter the
illegal conduct from happening (prevention). Lastly, the defense mandates
that the DOJ and SEC further clarify the defense by promulgating a list of
factors to be considered in determining whether procedures were adequate.
2. Administrative Guidance
The DOJ and SEC should follow Congress’s command and promulgate
a list of factors to be considered in determining what constitutes an adequate procedure.163 This clarity will give American firms guidance in developing and implementing anti-bribery policies and procedures, aimed at
incentivizing compliance with the Act. Additionally, the factors establish a
greater amount of predictability for firms operating overseas, taking away
some of the current uncertainty associated with FCPA’s expansive reach.

162

See BIEGELMAN & BIEGELMAN, supra note 16, at 212 (“An effective [compliance]
program is a program that works to prevent and detect violations of the law.”).
163
The DOJ has this ability under the 1988 FCPA amendment. See Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003(e), 102 Stat. 1107, 1417–18
(1988). The 1998 amendments allow the DOJ to determine whether the business community’s compliance with the FCPA would be enhanced “by further clarification of the
[anti-bribery] provisions.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(d). If the DOJ finds that such clarification
is needed, it is authorized to issue these guidelines, detailing conduct that would conform
to the Act’s anti-bribery provisions. Id. This prior legislation, in addition to the legislation
this Article proposes, is more than enough legal authority for the DOJ to take the suggested course and promulgate a list of factors. With respect to the SEC, the agency has
this ability under its Opinion Release Procedure. See supra note 86.
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This Article suggests the following factors (which should not be considered as being mutually exclusive from one another) in determining
whether a defense will be deemed adequate by a judicial body:
x
x
x
x
x

Board and Management Commitment: a commitment by the
board of directors and management to detect and prevent
bribery.
Policies and Procedures in Place Designed to Detect Bribery:
mechanisms established with the goal of analyzing the people and places where bribery may be a weakness.
Policies and Procedures in Place Designed to Prevent Bribery:
mechanisms established with the goal of deterring bribery.
Effective Implementation: ensuring that the policies and procedures are embedded and carried out throughout the firm.
Consistent Bribery Compliance Review: reviewing the firm’s
bribery policies, procedures, mechanisms, and overall compliance on a consistent basis.

These factors address the main areas associated with a strong compliance
program including top-level commitment, detection and prevention mechanisms, and consistent review.164 Because they are generally prescribed, it
ensures that corporations will have the freedom to implement programs
that best fit their respective situations.165 Additionally, the effective implementation factor helps ensure that firm bribery prevention actually exists
and that policies and procedures are more than mere paper-based policies
and procedures.
Specifically, with regard to the procedural mechanisms associated with
the defense, the defense would be asserted by a firm as an affirmative defense to liability in a FCPA enforcement action. Then, assuming the firm
can show that a number of the factors listed above were sufficiently present, the DOJ, SEC, or both may be more willing to drop the lawsuit or settle for a nominal amount. If the case proceeded to trial, the judiciary
would then apply and weigh the factors above.
Of course, like any legal proposal, there are a number of critiques that
could be made against the adequate procedures defense, which this Article
addresses below. Before addressing these critiques, however, the next section explains the projected outcomes of the defense.
164

See BIEGELMAN & BIEGELMAN, supra note 16, at 212.
Cf. William C. Athanas, When Doing Business Internationally Becomes a Crime:
Assisting Clients in Understanding and Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
71 ALA. LAW. 382, 386 (noting that compliance programs should not be “one size fits all”).
165

2013]

TAMING THE FCPA

63

B. Striking the Proper Balance: Predicted Outcomes of the Defense
Currently, firms have no recognized legal incentive to implement procedures designed to prevent bribery.166 There is no defense when an employee
decides to go rogue and bribe a foreign official.167 To be sure, the DOJ has
stated that anti-bribery procedures are considered at sentencing.168 However,
this consideration only takes place after liability is determined—certainly
little protection against aggressive prosecution.169 With the legal recognition
of an adequate procedures defense, companies will be motivated to implement compliance programs.170 These programs will lead to less bribery and
will allow the FCPA to accomplish its original goal.171
The defense will also give firms a counterweight to balance against the
current overreach of the FCPA. Although this defense does not prevent the
166

Koehler, Revisiting, supra note 20, at 627.
Doty, supra note 26, at 1235 (noting that “current law leaves largely unresolved
the central issue of when a company’s compliance system and anti-bribery policy are
[legally] sufficient” to guard against FCPA liability).
168
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2012).
169
FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 24 (statement of the Hon. Michael B. Mukasey)
(“There is [currently] no guarantee that a strong compliance program will be given the
weight it deserves.”); WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 13 (explaining that anti-bribery
procedures should be considered during the liability phase of litigation, not just at sentencing).
170
Cf. Andrew Weissmann with David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 432–33 (detailing the lack of incentives for corporations “to
implement effective compliance programs” given that “[u]nder the current legal regime, a
corporation is given no benefit at all under the law for even the best internal compliance
program if such crime nevertheless occurs”); see also Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry
Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate
Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (2007). In terms of incentivizing adequate procedures designed at complying with the Act, it may be useful to consider the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999). In
Kolstad, the Court, in examining punitive damages under a Title VII claim, held that “an
employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of
managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the employer’s ‘good-faith efforts
to comply with Title VII.’” Id. at 545. The court implied that its holding was due in part
to concerns that the existing standard was “[d]issuading employers from implementing
programs or policies to” comply with Title VII. Id. at 545. Similar logic can be applied to the
FCPA context because the current standard does not affirmatively persuade employers to
adopt adequate procedures designed to prevent against bribery. In fact, evidence suggests
that “very few companies are actually implementing best-in-class FCPA policies and
procedures.” The Benefits of an FCPA ‘Compliance Defense,’ CORP. COUNS. (Jan. 18,
2012) (interview by Catherine Dunn of Mike Koehler).
171
Klobuchar & Coons Letter, supra note 40 (noting “that effective guidance will
allow [U.S.] companies to comply with the [Act] more efficiently”); Koehler, Revisiting,
supra note 20, at 656 (explaining that incentives to compliance will reduce instances of
bribery and advance the FCPA’s objectives).
167
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DOJ or SEC from bringing actions, the defense could be influential at a
number of junctures in the litigation process, thereby reducing the monetary and reputational impact that a firm suffers.172 First, if a corporation
demonstrates that it had adequate procedures in place, the DOJ or SEC
may be less likely to start enforcement actions, saving the firm money in
legal fees and potential penalties. Second, assuming lawsuits commence,
firms will be less likely to settle for high sums when they know that a legitimate defense against liability exists. This will, in turn, either force the agencies to settle at nominal amounts or proceed to trial, where the adequate
procedures defense can be used to absolve a firm from liability. Additionally, if more FCPA corporate bribery cases go to trial, this will have the
added benefit of judicial clarification of the Act.173
Not only does the adequate procedures defense limit a firm’s liability
exposure, but it also adds predictability to a firm’s overseas actions.174
American corporations will be more likely to invest in resource-rich areas—
even those areas that may be prone to bribery—if they know that their goodfaith efforts to detect and prevent bribery will be given legal recognition.175
This added dimension (i.e., the defense) incentivizes overseas investment,
ingenuity, and growth. As part and parcel of a firm’s transactional plan, a
plan to prevent bribery can be implemented, and uncertainty over compliance with the FCPA disappears.176
An adequate procedures defense also aligns the FCPA with other foreign anti-bribery regimes that contain a similar defense.177 Because the
FCPA has been shown to affect American firms negatively in comparison
172

See supra Part II.A (documenting the monetary and reputational consequences that
come along with FCPA scrutiny).
173
Cf. FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 2 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (explaining that “the absence of case law ... confounds industries’ ability to conform to the law”);
WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that current incentives to settle enforcement actions “ensure that judicial oversight of FCPA cases will continue to be limited”).
174
Cf. Doty, supra note 26, at 1239 (implying that consistency and predictability in
the FCPA context will allow corporations “to accomplish complex tasks in difficult foreign venues”); Koehler, Revisiting, supra note 20, at 658 (noting that a compliance defense
would make the FCPA enforcement “more transparent, consistent, and predictable”).
175
See Doty, supra note 26, at 1239 (noting that the managers and directors of corporations want to comply with the FCPA, but that they just need to know “the how-to-do-it”).
176
Interestingly, one former DOJ official explained that firms that implement antibribery procedures find it improves business: “[T]hey are more profitable, not less profitable when they have appropriate controls in place.” Interview by PBS Frontline with
Mark Mendelsohn, Deputy Chief, Fraud Section, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice
(Apr. 7, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/blackmoney
/interviews/mendelsohn.html).
177
See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.
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to their foreign counterparts,178 an adequate procedures defense would
place American firms on an equal playing field.179
C. Responses to Anticipated Critique
This Article will now rebut a number of criticisms that will be made in
response to this proposal. First, opponents of a statutorily created defense
note that a de facto adequate procedures defense already exists because the
DOJ takes into consideration the existence of these procedures in deciding whether to prosecute, and these procedures are also credited at sentencing.180 Thus, these opponents claim that incentives already exist for a
firm to implement adequate anti-bribery procedures.181 However, with respect to prosecutorial discretion, this “opaque carrot” is not the proper way
to incentivize behavior, as discretion still remains, and therefore, litigation
can proceed.182 Moreover, with regard to sentencing credit, this consideration takes place after liability is established183 and after firms have invested
monetary sums on investigative and legal fees. In contrast, the adequate
procedures defense can be used to thwart liability,184 which leads to less
monetary investment on litigation-based expenses. Additionally, the defense
provides a real “tangible carrot” that incentivizes firms to comply with the Act.
Second, critics of the proposal may suggest that an adequate procedures defense could become a “blueprint for fraud”185 in that firms just
178

See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
See FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 24 (statement of the Hon. Michael B. Mukasey)
(noting that the addition of a compliance defense would “ensure consistent application of
anti-corruption law across jurisdictions”).
180
Examining Enforcement Hearing, supra note 160, at 26 (statement of Greg Andres,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General) (“[T]he Department already considers a company’s
compliance efforts in making appropriate prosecutorial decisions, and the United States
Sentencing Guidelines also appropriately credits a company’s compliance efforts in any
sentencing determination.”); see also David Kennedy & Dan Danielsen, Busting Bribery:
Sustaining the Global Momentum of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, OPEN SOC’Y
FOUNDS., Sept. 2011, at 29, available at http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1102&context=slaw_fac_pubs (noting that “the DOJ and SEC regularly take a company’s
compliance efforts into account at every stage of the enforcement process”).
181
Examining Enforcement Hearing, supra note 160, at 26 (statement of Greg Andres).
182
See FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 23 n.2 (statement of the Hon. Michael B.
Mukasey) (noting that “the government has complete discretion as to how much credit to
give for such a program”).
183
Id. at 24.
184
See Examining Enforcement Hearing, supra note 160, at 15 (statement of Andrew
Weisman, Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP) (“The statute should be modified ... to mandate consideration of compliance programs during the liability discussion of an FCPA prosecution.”).
185
Doty, supra note 26, at 1249 (noting one potential critique to his Reg. FCPA
proposal: that it is a “blueprint for fraud”).
179
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have to give the impression of adequate procedures and policies and then
the defense can be utilized. As part and parcel of this argument, critics
may argue that companies just “need to implement ... purely paper compliance program[s].”186 However, as noted above, both the Congressional
text establishing the defense and the administrative factors related to it
discern whether policies were actually implemented—that is, any defense
solely based on paper policies will not be adequate. To be sure, there is
always a judicial check on the defense; in cases that are litigated to the
end, the judiciary will be able to assess and apply the various factors, preventing firms from using the defense as a license and blueprint for fraud.
Third, supporters of the current regime claim that the FCPA’s ambiguous nature is integral to its purposes of preventing bribery.187 As explained
throughout this Article, however, the adequate procedures defense aims to
further this anti-bribery goal by incentivizing firms to implement procedures
designed to prevent bribery. At the same time, the defense mitigates some of
the negative business impacts associated with the Act’s current overreach.
CONCLUSION
Today many American corporations must look to develop business
outside of the U.S. For these firms, complying with the FCPA is difficult,
if not outright near impossible because of the Act’s overreach. Firms then
become risk adverse, often times opting to not pursue potential foreign
growth areas, resulting in market inefficiency and competitive disadvantage. These firms are in desperate need of a tool that will allow the FCPA’s
anti-bribery policy goals to continue while at the same time providing clarity
to spur overseas investment. This tool is an adequate procedures defense.

186

Examining Enforcement Hearing, supra note 160, at 26 (statement of Greg Andres);
see also Kennedy & Danielsen, supra note 180, at 31 (arguing that a “fig leaf” compliance
program would insulate firms from liability).
187
Doty, supra note 26, at 1249.

